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Tinkering with Success:
College Athletes, Social Media and
the First Amendment
Meg Penrose*
Good law does not always make good policy. This article
seeks to provide a legal assessment, not a policy directive. The
policy choices made by individual institutions and athletic
departments should be guided by law, but absolutely left to
institutional discretion. Many articles written on college
student-athletes’ social media usage attempt to urge policy
directives clothed in constitutional analysis.
In this author’s opinion, these articles have lost
perspective – constitutional perspective. This article seeks
primarily to provide a legal and constitutional assessment so
that schools and their athletic departments will have ample
information to then make their own policy choices.
I.

Introductory Perspective – To Implicate Is Not to Violate

Just because a regulation implicates the First Amendment
does not mean that regulation violates the First Amendment.1
In fact, many of the existing limits, and even season-long bans,
placed
on
college athletes’ social media usage are
* Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. Professor
Penrose, a former Division I scholarship athlete, teaches Constitutional Law,
Criminal Procedure and First Amendment. She also litigates in the area of
First Amendment to protect the speech and expression rights of all
Americans. She is extremely grateful to Professor Leslie Garfield and the
Pace Law Review for hosting such a timely, thoughtful and diverse
Symposium. The Editorial Board, and student members, of the Pace Law
Review deserve credit for their hard work and editorial support of all the
authors participating in this Symposium.
1. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04
(1984).
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constitutional.2
Do these regulations implicate the First
Amendment? Absolutely. But, do they violate the First
Amendment? Most likely not when a proper content-neutral
time, place and manner assessment is applied.3 Accepting this
conclusion requires a deeper appreciation and understanding of
the First Amendment, particularly in the unique context of
college athletics.4 In candor, accepting this conclusion requires
perspective.
When discussing the issue of a college student-athlete’s
First Amendment rights, it is imperative to appreciate
perspective. Many commentators decry any regulations on a
student-athlete’s speech because they fail to appreciate that
the goal of athletics is successful athletic performance. These
authors admonish schools and coaches, claiming that they
should be educating their athletes on the proper use and
handling of social media. In essence, these authors would
prefer to have coaches teach their athletes on the finer points of
social media, something many coaches are ill-equipped to do,
despite the fact that such lessons take away from the focus on
training athletes to excel on the court or on the field where the
focus truly is succeeding in sporting events. In reality, this
perspective asks coaches to “take their eye off the ball.”
2. See Meg Penrose, Outspoken: Social Media and the Modern College
Athlete, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 509 (2013).
3. See infra Part IV. See also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941).
4. See, e.g., Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1981)
(dismissing University of Oklahoma women’s basketball players’ First
Amendment challenge to the loss of their respective scholarships for
criticizing the head coach); Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1082 (10th Cir.
1972) (permitting dismissal of several University of Wyoming football team
members from the team after a dispute regarding the attempt by these team
members to wear black armbands during a game with Brigham Young
University to protest racial policies of the Mormon Church); Green v. Sandy,
No. 5:10-cv-367-JMH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114718, at *16 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 3,
2011) (finding no violation of a player’s First Amendment right and
dismissing the player from the soccer team for criticizing the women’s soccer
coach); Richard v. Perkins, 373 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1219 (D. Kan. 2005)
(finding no First Amendment violation when the track coach dismissed an
athlete from the team and no “constitutionally protected property or liberty
interests in participating in intercollegiate athletics.”).
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Instead of discussing offense, defense and strategy, many of
these authors believe – erroneously – that coaches should be
instructing on social media etiquette.
This “educational” approach ignores the proper role of
coaches – which is to field a winning team and prepare their
athletes for fair and successful competition.5 The primary goal
of college athletics, actually all athletic pursuits, is successful
athletic performance.
No one shows up to a game or
tournament hoping or preparing to lose. No athlete suits up
hoping to perform in mediocre fashion. Athletics, by its very
nature, separates teams and individual athletes into winners
and losers. All the hard work, sacrifice and training is endured
to claim victory, not defeat.
Articulating this primary goal of successful athletic
performance does not, however, minimize or discount the
importance of ensuring, at all times and in all ways, studentwelfare.6 Coaches have a continuing duty to protect their
athletes and to preserve their physical, mental and emotional
well-being. This entire article assumes that college coaches
and university personnel put student welfare before winning or
5. See Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995)
(upholding dismissal of college basketball coach for using the “N-word”
during a locker-room speech to allegedly motivate his players). In denying
that Dambrot had any First Amendment or academic freedom protection
afforded college faculty in the classroom, the Sixth Circuit explained,
“Dambrot's use of the N-word is even further away from the marketplace of
ideas and the concept of academic freedom because his position as coach is
somewhat different from that of the average classroom teacher. Unlike the
classroom teacher whose primary role is to guide students through the
discussion and debate of various viewpoints in a particular discipline,
Dambrot's role as a coach is to train his student athletes how to win on the
court. The plays and strategies are seldom up for debate. Execution of the
coach's will is paramount. Moreover, the coach controls who plays and for
how long, placing a disincentive on any debate with the coach's ideas which
might have taken place.” Id.
6. In fact, student welfare may present an entirely separate and
independent basis for imposing time, place and manner regulations on
student-athletes’ use of social media, including season long bans. Because
the issue of student welfare is enveloped in the current thesis (emphasizing
winning as the primary goal of athletics presumes student-welfare has been
preserved in the process), the author will save for another day a longer, more
extensive treatment of student welfare as an independent basis for
supporting time, place and manner restrictions on student-athletes’ social
media usage.
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any other issue relating to athletic performance. Student
welfare is a principal goal of the entire NCAA structure,7 which
limits practice time and seeks to ensure that an athlete
receives dual protection in their varying roles as a student and
an athlete.8 The packaging of this legal argument assumes,
always, that successful athletic performance is being achieved
– or targeted – only in a manner that protects student welfare
and an athlete’s well-being.9 The student-athlete’s physical
and emotional welfare is the paramount concern, or should be,
of every athletic department. Thus, this article takes as a
given that student welfare and protection will always precede
decisions, both on and off the court, that impact a student
athlete.
Accepting that successful athletic performance can be
accomplished without sacrificing student welfare and well7. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 2013-2014, NCAA DIVISION I
MANUAL,
CONST.
art.
2.2,
3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D114.pdf.
8. Id. at 3. “2.2.3 Health and Safety. It is the responsibility of each
member institution to protect the health of, and provide a safe environment
for, each of its participating student-athletes. (Adopted: 1/10/95))[; and]
2.2.4 Student-Athlete/Coach Relationship. It is the responsibility of each
member institution to establish and maintain an environment that fosters a
positive relationship between the student-athlete and coach. (Adopted:
1/10/95)).” Id.
9. Id. at 4.
2.2.4 The Principle of Sportsmanship and Ethical Conduct,
For intercollegiate athletics to promote the character
development of participants, to enhance the integrity of
higher education and to promote civility in society, studentathletes, coaches, and all others associated with these
athletics programs and events should adhere to such
fundamental values as respect, fairness, civility, honesty
and responsibility. These values should be manifest not only
in athletics participation, but also in the broad spectrum of
activities affecting the athletics program. It is the
responsibility of each institution to: (Revised: 1/9/96) (a)
Establish policies for sportsmanship and ethical conduct in
intercollegiate athletics consistent with the educational
mission and goals of the institution; and (Adopted:
1/9/96)[,] (b) Educate, on a continuing basis, all
constituencies about the policies in Constitution 2.4-(a).
(Adopted: 1/9/96)[.]
Id.
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being, one returns to the primary goal of college athletics. No
school seeks to field a losing team, and few fans enjoy following
marginally competitive teams.10 America loves winners. And,
Americans love their college athletes.11 But, as we enter the
realm of athletic speech, it becomes critical to honestly embrace
each of our perspectives to fully appreciate our respective
constitutional biases.
If an individual argues for the so-called rights of college
athletes to use social media without regulation, is she
espousing that “right” for their benefit or hers? Does that
individual really want her favorite athlete to be tweeting about
his or her college experience while she is preparing for an
important game or tournament? And, are they following the
student-athlete in their student capacities (craving information
about their classwork, their laboratories, their thesis and
writing or a change in major) or wanting to hear about the
exploits of an 18- to 23-year-old living the athletic dream of
playing football for Texas A&M or Notre Dame or playing
basketball for Duke or Kansas? The truth is probably that
most fans, a term derived from the word “fanatic,” are far more
interested in the college athlete’s life as an athlete, with little
to no interest in their educational pursuits.12 Ours is quickly
10. Blair Browning & Jimmy Sanderson, The Positives and Negatives of
Twitter: Exploring How Student Athletes Use Twitter and Respond to Critical
Tweets, 5 INT’L J. SPORTS COMM. 503, 506 (2012). “For many people, sports
fandom is a significant component of their social identity (Trujillo & Krizek,
1994; Wann, Royalty, & Roberts, 2000). This identity, grounded in
attachments to teams and athletes, can provoke maladaptive behaviors
(Wakefield & Wann, 2006), particularly if athletes or teams do not meet fans’
expectations.” Id.
11. Id. “One reason for Twitter’s popularity is the increased access it
gives fans to athletes and sports figures (Sanderson, 2011a, 2013). While this
enhanced immediacy can be positive, it brings with it problems, particularly
for student-athletes.” Id.
12. Cf., Bruce Feldman, Social-Media Savvy Grows, Even as Coaches,
Schools Try to Keep Up, CBSSPORTS.COM (Mar. 13, 2012, 4:29 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/story/17771677/socialmedia-savvygrows-even-as-coaches-schools-try-to-keep-up. Feldman aptly describes the
problem:
The level of celebrity for college athletes has never extended
further than it does these days. The reason? Start with
significantly more TV coverage and 24-hour, wall-to-wall
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becoming a TMZ-focused society, one that relishes the next
outrageous story involving an athlete or entertainer.
For those schooled in constitutional rights, it should be
clear that student-athletes are far more regulated than their
traditional college counterparts.13 Student-athletes wear two
separate hats – one as a student, where robust First
Amendment rights remain,14 and another as an athlete, where
speech and expression rights have long been regulated by
coaches, athletic departments and even athletic conferences.
Courts analyzing social media regulations on college-athletes
will likely appreciate these distinctions as they have in the
past.15 And, if coaches and athletic programs continue to
impose time, place and manner regulations (such as no
Facebook or Twitter during season or before, after and during
athletic contests) that are content-neutral, these regulations
are far more likely to pass constitutional muster than those
that target particular words and phrases using policing
software programs, as content-based regulations receive higher
constitutional scrutiny. Further, recent legislative attempts to
prevent coaches or other school officials from monitoring their
media while the definition of “media” continues to morph
into something much different in recent years, mirroring the
often-contorted modern-day definition of celebrity. In
football, kids become commodities and get famous before
they sign with a college as worshipping fan bases and
obsessed media hang on their every move. Add in a level of
unprecedented accessibility to these players and it’s a
combustible mix.
Id.
13. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting
the well-established fact that “student athletes are subject to more
restrictions than the student body at large. . . .”).
14. Cf., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). The Supreme
Court helped explain this distinction somewhat in a different context in
Keyishian: “The classroom is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’ United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372.” Id. at 603.
15. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 658 (Cal. 1994)
(noting that intercollegiate athletes are subjected to “special regulation of
sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other activities that intrude significantly on
privacy interests . . . not shared by other students or the population at
large.”).
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student-athletes’ social media, while passed with good
intentions, actually forces programs to choose either to ban or
limit their athletes’ social media usage under time, place and
manner analysis, or forego any regulation and risk team
disruption or athletic fallout from errant social media
Coaches literally must decide how important
postings.16
Facebook and Twitter are in relation to athletic performance.
Just because a regulation implicates the First Amendment
does not mean that regulation violates the First Amendment.17
As the Supreme Court observed in City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, even complete bans on speech may be
constitutionally permissible.18 Writing for the Court, Justice
Stevens reminded:
The ordinance prohibits appellees from
communicating with the public in a certain
manner, and presumably diminishes the total
quantity of their communication in the City. The
application of the ordinance to appellees’
expressive activities surely raises the question
whether the ordinance abridges their “freedom of
speech” within the meaning of the First
Amendment, and appellees certainly have
standing to challenge the application of the
ordinance to their own expressive activities. “But
to say the ordinance presents a First Amendment
issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes
16. See, e.g., Pam Greenberg, Employer Access to Social Media
Usernames and Passwords, NAT. CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-mediapasswords.aspx (listing six states that have enacted legislation and fourteen
states that have introduced legislation restricting employers or educators
from requesting access to social networking sites of employees and students).
See also CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 99120–22 (Deering 2012) (prohibiting
educational institutions in California from requesting access to student social
media accounts, asking for associated usernames or passwords, giving
information from such networks, or punishing students for failing to give
such information, if asked).
17. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803-04
(1984).
18. Id.
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a First Amendment violation.” Metromedia, Inc.
v. San Diego, 453 U.S. at 561 (Burger C. J.,
dissenting). It has been clear since this Court’s
earliest decisions concerning the freedom of
speech that the state may sometimes curtail
speech when necessary to advance a significant
and legitimate state interest. Schenck v. United
States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).19
The failure of many fans, and even scholars, to appreciate
this distinction is understandable. But, my guess is that the
many voices claiming social media regulations on college
athletes “violate” the First Amendment are based on
perspective – their perspectives – which may not always be a
proper legal, much less constitutionally-supported, perspective.
Of course the fan wants greater access to the athlete and the
locker room. The fan wants to be in the athlete’s head when he
faces that last second field goal or she is at the free-throw line
with the game on the line. The fan wants to know, “What are
they thinking? What motivates them?” But, the Constitution
does not necessarily require that a coach permit such
unfettered access.
The coach’s job is to train that student-athlete to make the
field goal and convert those free-throws. The coach’s job is to
provide opportunities for the student athlete to excel
athletically. In contrast, the teacher’s job is to educate. And,
while coaches teach important life skills, my sense is that
courts will not impose on coaches the line of cases focused on
classroom speech and expression but rather will analyze the
issue of purely athletic speech through the lens of sport where
athletic performance is the primary focus. Successful athletic
performance – at least for the coach and athlete – is probably
more important than robust First Amendment rights in a
locker room on or the pitch. To the athlete, athletic success is
more important than unfettered Facebook or Twitter access.
Or, at least this is the preference demonstrated by most college

19. Id.
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athletes.20
II. Further Perspective – First Amendment Lawyer, Former
College Athlete
I am a former Division I college athlete. In fact, I left
college with absolutely no debt because my athletic skills,
though far exceeded by my college teammates, enabled me to
obtain five years of fully-funded educational opportunity. For
four years, I played guard on the Women’s Basketball team. I
rarely started and was far from an extraordinary college
athlete. My coach once remarked she wished she could put my
“heart and desire into one of [her] more talented athletes.”
This is what many consider a back-handed compliment.
Knowing my coach, she meant exactly what she said, but
meant absolutely no disrespect. She spoke the truth. Her
comment gave me perspective, important perspective – I had
reached my athletic pinnacle, at least in basketball, in high
school.
Following my fourth year as a player, I was privileged to
stay on as a Graduate Assistant Coach for the Women’s
Basketball team. This experience gave me further, but very
different, perspective. Not only was I able to experience
Division I athletics and all that it entails as a player, but I was
also given a small glimpse into the many issues facing coaches
whose careers literally hang on the judgment of 18- to 23-yearolds, many of whom are living away from home for the first
20. Chris Fuhrmeister, Clemson Bans Football Players From Twitter
(And Players Don’t Mind), SB NATION, (Aug. 1, 2013 4:36 PM),
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/8/1/4579944/clemson-footballplayers-twitter. Apparently, Clemson – like many other programs – chose to
ban Twitter during season to enable its players to focus on football. As the
athletes signed off from Twitter, many appreciated it was time to get down to
the business of football. Representative tweets include: “Alright twitter,
time to do work. I'll be back in January.” Id. (quoting tweet from Chandler
Catanzaro); “It's time to hop in the football season submarine. See you next
year.” Id. (quoting tweet from Ronnie Geohaghan Jr.); “Alright twitter it's
been real. Time to get this job. Next thing I tweet will be after the BCS
championship[.]” Id. (quoting tweet from Jordan Legget); and, “Because we
are all in[.]” Id. (quoting tweet from D. O’Daniel). College athletes, whose
conduct has been strictly regulated since childhood, appreciate that coaches
have rules that help players focus on their sport. Twitter bans appear to fall
in this realm, at least for athletes.
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time. Coaching is not nearly as glamorous as it appears.
Playing college athletics was exhilarating, culminating a
young life spent practicing and preparing for Division I
competition. Prior to age 22, everything in my life centered on
basketball and athletics. If I was not practicing, training,
running or studying basketball, I was dreaming of my
opportunity to take that last second shot, make that last free
throw. Playing was about performing and succeeding on the
court. Coaching, in contrast, showed me how often the
judgment of 18- to 23-year-olds is colored by their limited life
experience. If athletic performance and success is all that
matters to an 18- to 23-year-old, that individual most likely
lacks perspective. I know I did. I know my teammates did. I
know my sister, who played Division I volleyball, did. I know
my brothers-in-law, who played Division I basketball and
football, did. We all did, until we spent time coaching.
Coaching gives an entirely different perspective. Coaching
focuses on team first, individual second. Coaching emphasizes
team performance and ensuring that team chemistry remains
viable and effective. The goal of a coach is to keep several
individuals with vastly different personalities focused on a
unitary goal – winning. The goal of a player is, in contrast and
generally speaking, to further their individual talents in a
particular athletic endeavor. The goals of coaches and players
overlap, but they are not identical. The perspective of coaches
and their athletes, likewise, are often worlds apart.
Another perspective that is increasingly being expressed is
the fan’s perspective. Twenty-first century fans seek, if not
demand, greater and greater access to their favorite players.
Social media, be it Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, or Pinterest,
enables fans to gain immediate access to their favorite players
to support, taunt, laud or criticize them. And, in a culture
where athletes are some of the most revered individuals in
society, such access is highly desired. TMZ and social media
have blurred the fan’s perspective from simply rooting for his
or her favorite team into demanding greater access into their
favorite player’s world – the world of an 18- to 23-year-old
college student. Thus, it is not uncommon in my experience to
see fans raise First Amendment concerns on the behalf of
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college athletes when those fans want unlimited 24/7 access to
their favorite player. “It is their right,” has become a common
refrain of fans.
While I am a fan, I am also a fan that appreciates and
studies the law. And, my legal education has given me yet
another, distinct perspective. When I completed college, my
lack of debt enabled me to attend graduate school. I still
consider my five years of paid education the greatest perk of
having played college basketball. Having learned discipline,
dedication and perseverance during athletics, law school
became a natural fit. Reading cases for hours, studying legal
theory, appreciating the limits of government and law, I came
to appreciate that the law is not nearly as neat or as clean as
many perceive. Law is as complicated as any offensive or
defensive scheme known in athletics. Law is as fluid as any
athletic contest with stakes often higher than playing for a
national championship. The law is amazing but its proper
application requires perspective. So, I learned. I studied. As
an athlete I was trained to win and always eager to compete.
So, I competed. I trained my mind. I looked at all angles of the
law tirelessly. I refused to quit. And, ultimately, I excelled,
due largely to the lessons taught during athletic competition.
The tenacity I exerted in law school had been honed many
years before in athletics.
Eventually, I became a law professor. I continue to train
my mind, learning and studying, all the while gaining
additional perspective as a teacher of law. Every day, I am
coaching the brightest and most talented individuals to become
lawyers – to “succeed” at law school to “perform” as lawyers. I
try to build character. I try to instill discipline, focus and, yes,
even teamwork.
Law, much like athletics, requires
collaboration to successfully perform. And, law, much like
athletics, is usually about winning.
This article seeks to offer my legal perspective on the
intersection of college athletes, social media and the First
Amendment. I gained this perspective having played athletics,
having coached athletes, and having taught and continuing to
teach law students. My legal perspective may not be popular
among fans, deferring to coaches and athletic departments in
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their goal to train athletes to be good citizens and effective
players. My legal assessment grants coaches and athletic
departments more latitude to decide what, if any, limits should
be placed on their student-athletes’ social media usage. The
policy choice, under my legal analysis, is left to coaches and
institutions even as fans champion their favorite college
athletes’ First Amendment rights.
My perspective is undoubtedly colored by my training as
an athlete, my brief experience as a coach, and my nearly two
decades spent as a lawyer and, ultimately, a law professor.
You may not agree with me. You may not embrace what I have
to say. But, my comments should be kept in their proper
perspective. I am not arguing policy. I am not favoring a
particular choice that should be made. I am analyzing law.
I was an athlete first. I have experienced life at the
Division I level being placed under a coach’s restrictions. I
have endured playing, losing, winning, taunting, cheering,
advising and endless coaching. I have seen this issue from
inside – which gives me a unique perspective – one,
unfortunately, shared by very few fans and even fewer judges.
To me, the question of social media usage is not merely
theoretical. The issue is both pragmatic and personal. Are
fans really in the best position to argue for the free speech
rights of their favorite athletes? And, in doing so, are these
fans really doing the athletes a favor or a disservice? Most
importantly, are fans urging these “rights” to serve the best
interests of the athletes or themselves?
Many, many blogs and articles boldly proclaim that social
media bans violate a college athlete’s First Amendment
rights.21 As Lee Corso has so often admonished, “[n]ot so fast
my friend.” True, the First Amendment is often implicated by
restrictions on speech. But, implicating the First Amendment
is not the same as violating the First Amendment.22 And, as I
21. See, e.g., J. Wes Gay, Hands Off Twitter: Are NCAA Student-Athlete
Social Media Bans Unconstitutional?, 39 FLA. STATE L. REV. 781 (2012). See
also, Eric Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use
of Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices, 38 J.
COLL. & UNIV. L. 451 (2012).
22. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 803-04.
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continue to assert, coaches and athletic departments likely
have the legal – no, the Constitutional – right to limit their
athletes’ access to social media.
You have the First
Amendment right to disagree with my conclusions. I hope as
you do so, you will consider the influences of your own training,
your own experiences and your own perspective. Are you a
former college athlete? Are you an attorney, with an emphasis
in First Amendment? Or, are you a fan – someone interested
in getting to know your favorite college athlete better through
social media? Your perspective, like mine, probably colors your
opinion.
Athletes are trained to focus on successful athletic
performance and the discipline it takes to win. We are taught
to sacrifice for the sake of the team, the university. Athletes
have given years to training, made sacrifices, and have
endured rules and regulations that may seem odd to those
outside athletics. But, athletes willingly forgo a traditional
college experience for the amazing opportunity to compete and
represent an institution’s athletic department. Athletes are
taught to keep our focus – on and off the court, on and off the
field. We often do things that are uncomfortable for others and
do so knowing that our team, and university, will benefit from
our sacrifices.
Athletics is, in the end, truly about successful performance.
And, while we expect our coaches to train athletes how to be
good citizens, not merely good players, coaches, players and
teams are judged by their performances, not their speech or
expressive activity. The omnipresent nature of social media
undoubtedly complicates this equation.23
The First
Amendment does not. Coaches have the constitutional right to
limit their athletes’ speech and do so on a regular basis. This is
23. See, e.g., Adam Hughes, Purdue Basketball Twitter Ban: Fan
Reaction,
YAHOO!
SPORTS
(Oct.
17,
2011),
http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ycn-10229161. As Hughes explains:
“While fans may enjoy [the athletes’] antics, they do little to shed a flattering
light on a university or its programs, so it’s not hard to understand [the
coach’s] hesitancy to let his players hit the Web. Add in the fact that these
are young men who don’t always show the best judgment, and it’s not farfetched to imagine one or more of them revealing some tidbit or other that
would amount to a tactical advantage for their opponents . . . .” Id.
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nothing new. This is nothing remarkable. And, it is certainly
nothing that has historically been seen as violating the First
Amendment.
Does a coach’s decision to limit his or her student-athlete’s
access to social media implicate the First Amendment? Yes, it
does. But that is not the ultimate question. Rather, the
question is whether such limits violate the First Amendment.
Contrary to many other commentators, I believe these limits –
regardless of their wisdom from a policy perspective – are
constitutional content-neutral limitations permitted under
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions.
III. The Important Perspective – The Heavily Regulated World
of College Athletics
College athletes are generally the most regulated students
on campus.24 Athletes often are required to report to campus
long before classes begin, must pass a physical in order to
enroll in an athletics class, and often must maintain a
particular grade point average to remain on the team.25 They
must attend study hall, have access to unique tutors and
tutoring26 and find themselves traveling the country, if not the
world, in pursuit of athletic competition.27 Some of the
regulations imposed on athletes come directly from the NCAA,
including requirements that an athlete maintain a continued

24. See Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir. 2007).
25. See, Jeff Stone, A Hidden Toxicity in the Term “Student-Athlete”:
Stereotype Threat for Athletes in the College Classroom, 2 LAW & POL’Y J. 179,
179 (2012) (observing that NCAA regulations mandate college athletes
“enroll in at least twelve semester units, declare a major, maintain a
cumulative grade-point-average of 1.8 or higher, and make academic progress
toward a degree.”). Id.
26. The
Value
of
College
Sports,
NCAA.ORG,
http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/value-college-sports (last visited Apr.
12, 2015) (explaining that college athletes “receive academic support, such as
state-of-the-art technology and tutoring, and have access to athlete-focused
academic advisors in addition to traditional academic advisors.”).
27. See e.g., Michael Braun, Finding A Balance: College Student
Athletes, HASHTAGS (April 23, 2013), http://sites.jmu.edu/103molloy/finding-abalance-college-student-athletes/ (describing the differing experiences of four
interviewed college athletes).
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level of progress toward a degree, while others come directly
from the athletic department or a coach.28 But, college athletes
face a myriad of regulations that more traditional college
students do not.
Many college athletes are prohibited from smoking,
drinking (even if legally of age), staying out all night, going
home during Thanksgiving, Christmas or spring break.29 The
traditional college experience is not one shared by the college
athlete. College athletes are randomly subjected to drug
tests.30 College students, unfortunately, often experiment with
drugs and, unless arrested, face no consequences for doing so.
A college athlete’s career could end, and scholarship
withdrawn, with such experimentation. College athletes are
often required to submit attendance reports to coaches or
tutors while their more traditional college roommate sleeps the
day away. College athletes are often required to attend team
meetings, study film and avoid classes that conflict with their
practice or game schedules.31 Their majors may be impacted by
their sport and their sport’s travel schedule. College athletes
28. Student-Athletes: Dress Code, in SOUTH CAROLINA STUDENT-ATHLETE
CODE OF CONDUCT HANDBOOK. When traveling, male members of the South
Carolina athletic program are to “refrain from wearing earrings” and female
athletes are expected to “wear a dress, skirt, or dress slacks.” These
regulations are based on the fact that “[s]tudent-athletes are public
representatives of the University of South Carolina both on and off the field.”
29. See, e.g., University of Delaware Student-Athlete Code of Conduct
Form, in UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE STUDENT-ATHLETE CODE OF CONDUCT
HANDBOOK (requiring athlete signature) (proscribing “[t]he use and
possession of drugs, tobacco, alcohol . . . are strictly prohibited while an
individual is a student-athlete at UD”).
30. One of the more recent examples occurred in the first NCAA College
Football National Championship game in January, 2015. One of Oregon
University’s wide receivers, Darren Carrington, was disqualified from
participating in the national championship game due to failing an NCAAsanctioned drug test.
ESPN indicated that multiple reports confirm
Carrington tested positive for marijuana. Unlike traditional college students
who are not subjected to random drug tests, college athletes can lose
numerous benefits, and face athletic sanctions, under such mandatory,
randomly administered tests. See Brett McMurphy, Darren Carrington
Ruled Ineligible, ESPN (Jan. 10, 2015), http://espn.go.com/collegefootball/bowls14/story/_/id/12145339/darren-carrington-oregon-ducksineligible-national-championship-mark-helfrich-says.
31. Madelaine Jerousek-Smith, Remarkable Students, Remarkable
Athletes, 50 Parent Times Online 2 (2006).
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may be expected to take summer school and winter intercession
classes to open up their academic schedule for more early
morning workouts or game-related travel.32 The schedules of
college athletes are not theirs to choose. Rather, that schedule
is influenced, if not chosen, by someone else whose focus in on
the unique demands of college studies on the student-athlete.33
Thus, the life of a college athlete is heavily regulated.
Athletes both expect and accept this fact. Fans, unfamiliar
with the demands of Division I competition, may properly think
that time spent off the court or away from the field should be
entirely the student athlete’s time. But, that impression is a
far cry from an athlete’s reality.
College athletes have
schedules that are far from their own – often including team
meals, NCAA required training sessions, volunteer activities
required by the team or athletic department.
Athletes learn at a very early age that weekends are spent
in competition and weekdays are spent practicing. Those that
want to blend in with the general population often find
themselves blending right out of college athletics. Division I
athletes must be disciplined, regimented and willing to
sacrifice for their team and sport. I do not say this as a
dictatorial mandate but rather as a fact of what is required to
succeed and play at the highest level. Athletes accept they will
surrender part of their college experience in exchange for
participating on a team. Athletes expect to be given a list of
“team rules.” The inclusion of rules relating to speech and
conduct are something that the athlete will have faced many,
many times before – from penalties for taunting and excessive
celebration to personal fouls for cursing or inappropriate
language. Athletes live in a world that is heavily structured
and regulated from day one, beginning at the earliest age. The
Constitutional equation assessing the First Amendment rights
of college athletes, similar to those addressing search and
32. Id.
33. Andrew Rhim, The Special Relationship Between Student-Athletes
and Colleges: An Analysis of a Heightened Duty of Care for the Injuries of
Student-Athletes, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 329, 338 (1996) (contending that
“some [student-athletes] will never look over course descriptions or
educational requirements. Rather, academic courseloads and concentrations
of study are determined by assistant coaches in charge of academics.”).
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seizure, will undoubtedly turn on this heavily regulated
atmosphere.
If existing case law serves as a harbinger in this area, the
Constitution will tolerate more regulation of a college athlete
than a traditional college student.34
Athletes are, quite
literally, special and different. While many focus on the
regulations imposed upon athletes, one must not forget the
many perks that flow directly to athletes as a result of their
participation. For every Thanksgiving dinner I missed in
college due to playing in a basketball tournament, I received
the opportunity to travel this amazing country – from
Manhattan, Kansas, to Manhattan, New York. For every
Christmas or winter break that I was on campus alone with my
teammates working toward a winning season, I was rewarded
with funds for my books, labs and tuition. We were in our
dorms and apartments studying offenses and defenses in our
school-issued gear, wearing top-of-the-line shoes, while our
colleagues were out drinking and watching movies. I watched
film, studying offenses and defenses, then walked to study hall
where I refocused on Edgar Allen Poe, Nathanial Hawthorne
and English History. I had early morning practice, class, then
more practice. But, I was well-fed, well-traveled and wellregarded. I was a student-athlete but my roles as student and
athlete were always distinct and distinguishable.
At practice I was an athlete, expected to focus my time and
talents on basketball. In the classroom I was a student,
expected to appreciate the finer points of mathematical
equations or governmental structures. I passed balls to my
teammates as an athlete and passed exams in class as a
student. The verbs may be the same, but the law should not
treat these experiences as equivalent in any regard. The
athlete’s role and rights are distinct from the student’s.
As an athlete, I learned lessons that transcended the
classrooms of my incredible professors. I learned to sacrifice
34. See, e.g., Wildman v. Marshalltown Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 768, 771 (8th
Cir. 2001) (observing that “an educational environment conducive to learning
team unity and sportsmanship and free from disruptions and distractions
that could hurt or stray the cohesiveness of the team” permit greater
limitation on a student-athlete’s First Amendment rights).
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self for others so that our team could collectively pursue
victory. I learned to work with people on the court that I
avoided off the court because we shared a common goal. They
were my teammates and we fought together. I learned the
harder you work, the more you sacrifice, the more you can
achieve. My life was bound up in basketball more than any
other part of the college experience. And, this was at a smaller
Division I college – not a Texas A&M, Notre Dame, Duke or
Kansas.
The truth is college athletes are special and different. As
student-athletes they have special tutors, special dining halls
and team meals, special travel, special gear unique to each
athletic team, special facilities and quiet study places for
athletes only, special nutritional and training opportunities.
Thus, it should not at all be controversial that the law would
treat these individuals in a special and different manner.
Coaches understandably seek to limit their athletes’ social
media usage because the light shines far brighter on the college
athlete than the traditional college student.35 If a regular
35. Bob Wolfley, After Loss to Badgers, Iowa’s Zach McCabe Tweets His
Anger, Prompting Fran McCaffery to Ban Twitter, J. SENTINEL (Feb. 25,
2014), http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/sports/247135701.html.
The Iowa
Hawkeyes Men’s Basketball team provides one such example. Following a
tough loss on February 22nd, Zach McCabe lashed out on his Twitter account
at 2:49 p.m. as follows: “The fact that I have iowa fans saying shit me (sic) is
insane . . . You fans suck . . . Suck a fat one all of you.” Id. (quoting tweet
from Zach McCabe). As in nearly every other Twitter fiasco, the Tweet was
immediately deleted (but not before several people captured screen shots to
keep the tweet in perpetuity), McCabe cancelled his Twitter account and then
his coach placed a Twitter ban on the entire team; Iowa Coach McCaffery
Tells Players to Get Off Twitter, FOX SPORTS (Feb 24, 2014),
http://msn.foxsports.com/college-basketball/story/iowa-fran-mccaffery-tellsplayers-to-get-off-twitter1-022414. In a February 24, 2014, story on Fox
Sports, the following story appeared:
Iowa coach Fran McCaffery has instructed the Hawkeyes to
shut down their Twitter accounts for the rest of the season
after senior Zach McCabe exchanged barbs with detractors
on the social media service. McCabe air-balled a 3-pointer
that could have tied the game with 16 seconds left against
Wisconsin on Saturday. The 20th-ranked Hawkeyes went on
to lose 79-74. McCabe responded to negative comments
directed at him on Twitter by lashing out at his critics after
the game. McCabe deleted the post and apologized.
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student makes a racist or homophobic comment, chances are it
will not make the evening news, be reported perpetually on
ESPN or announced nationally through USA Today. But, have
a standout wide-receiver or a starting point guard make a
boneheaded comment or give away information about their or a
teammate’s injury status and a team can find itself focusing on
public relations issues rather than offense or defense.36 One
commentator even remarked the media waits, eagerly, for a
public debacle.37 Unfettered social media usage lends itself to
disrupting team chemistry and team performance.38 And, as
McCaffery says his overall impressions of social media are
negative and that he'd prefer his players keep their focus on
Iowa's upcoming games. He said his players are free to
resume tweeting once the season is over.
Id.
Coach McCaffery’s in-season ban is precisely the type of ban likely to pass
constitutional muster. The point of this ban is directly related to his team’s
on-court success and is not based on particular viewpoint or content. All
Twitter feeds will be banned. Thus, this and similar in-season bans should
easily survive as a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction
analysis.
36. See Hughes, supra note 23.
37. Gregg Doyel, Coaches’ Twitter Ban Isn’t Stunting Players, It’s
Protecting
Them,
CBSSPORTS.COM
(Aug.
9,
2011),
http://www.cbssports.com/columns/story/15416882 (In an incredibly candid
moment, Doyle explained: “If a college athlete says the wrong thing on
Twitter, people like me are going to hear about [it]. We’re going to talk about
it on the radio and write about it in the newspaper or on the Internet. By the
time we’re finished, the player’s name will be in shambles and his coach will
be performing damage control. As for us, we leave the wreckage in our rearview and move on to the next guy.”).
38. Dave Southorn, Two Years Later, Petersen Happy with Twitter Ban,
IDAHO
PRESS-TRIBUNE
(Sept.
12,
2012,
12:39
PM),
http://www.idahopress.com/blogs/sports/dave/two-years-later-petersen-happywith-twitter-ban/article_1f0dc592-fd09-11e1-9b5b-001a4bcf887a.html
(responding to questions about his decision to ban Twitter, Coach Peterson
stated, “‘I’m glad we do it . . . . It just serves no purpose, in my opinion, for
what we’re trying to do here. It’s just distracting.’”). Id. See also, Greg
Wallace, Clemson Twitter Ban Raises Questions of Education, Abuse, ORANGE
&
WHITE
(Aug.
10,
2012,
6:40
PM),
http://www.orangeandwhite.com/news/2012/aug/10/clemson-twitter-banraises-questions-education-abu/ (“Clemson coach Dabo Swinney says the ban
is a matter of keeping his players’ minds focused on the field.”). Coach
Swinney further underscored that “[Y]ou take an 18, 22 year old young
person who’s got 30,000 followers, and it’s just one more distraction, one more
thing, one more obligation . . . [, and w]e’re not going to participate in that
throughout the season.” Phil Chardis, Men’s Basketball Notes: Social Media
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such disruption runs counter to the main goal of athletics –
successful athletic performance – chances are that courts will
provide coaches with greater latitude than traditional college
professors.39
Equally problematic are the fragile egos and psyches of 18to 23-year-old athletes. These individuals have sacrificed their
entire lives to reach the college level and in an instant a
hateful comment from someone outside the team, outside the
program, can shred an athlete’s confidence.40 Tragically, there
Another Issue for Coaches, JOURNALINQUIRER.COM (Jan. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM),
http://www.journalinquirer.com/sports/men-s-basketball-notes-social-mediaanother-issue-for-coaches/article_8a6e4e70-d915-5f1e-aa4a16fb4dcd4abd.html. Coach Steve Lavin, like many other coaches who have
banned social media, spoke of the distractions that social media causes as the
rationale for his “during the season” ban. Heather Dinich, Twitter Ban Good
Move by Jimbo Fisher, ESPN COLLEGE FOOTBALL (July 26, 2012, 2:00 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/acc/post/_/id/41280/twitter-ban-good-move-by-jimbofisher (noting that Coach Fisher considers Twitter “clutter.”). Fisher defends
his policy by noting that, “[I]t’s a lot easier when there are less distractions.”
Id. It is interesting to note that once Twitter was banned at Florida State,
the team won a national championship one year later. Focus, it appears, may
be relevant to athletic success.
39. Browning & Sanderson, supra note 10, at 509-11 (explaining the
endemic, obsessive nature of Twitter among college athletes). Professors
Browning and Sanderson spoke of athletes admitting they checked Twitter
during games, despite rules barring such use and noted the image/ego issues
that Twitter accounts encourage. Id. at 511. The pair detailed their empirical
research as follows: “Participants reported having used Twitter for as little as
5 1/2 months and for as long as 4 years (M = 18 months). They reported
having Twitter followers ranging from as few as 100 to 18,263 (M = 3,207).
Participants reported checking Twitter frequently throughout the day,
ranging from 20 to hundreds of times each day (these student-athletes shared
that they configured Twitter to alert them each time they were mentioned or
that they would simply look at their phone every few minutes). All studentathletes stated they accessed Twitter on their cellular phone due to
convenience, and they stated that only in the rarest of cases would they
access Twitter via a computer.” Id. at 509. And, while the Browning &
Sanderson study was limited to a small pool of student athletes, there is no
reason to think that their findings diverge in any manner from other
similarly situation college athletes.
40. Id. at 516 (“‘Student-athletes’ being ripe candidates for criticism is
nothing new, but two things that appear to be escalating are the boldness of
the critics and the immediacy of their messages. Twitter’s rise has been
accompanied by what appears, at least anecdotally, to be a hypercritical
society in which people seem to feel empowered to send very demeaning or
condemning messages to student-athletes via Twitter.
This brazen
confidence stems from the protection users have behind the phone or
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are so many examples they are difficult to catalogue.41 But,
Professors Browning and Sanderson do a nice job of
summarizing the injury (and distraction) that Twitter causes
on the emotional level for college athletes:
While hate mail has always been around,
Twitter has exponentially increased the ease
with which such messages reach athletes. In fact,
only 2 of the 20 student athletes [in the
Professor’s study] reported having their Twitter
accounts private. Essentially, this means that 18
of the 20 participants have their Twitter
accounts set up in a way that enables anyone
who wishes to follow them to do so and, as such,
have access to anything that they tweet. Unlike
Facebook, where users have to agree to be
friends, Twitter does not necessitate this step
unless a user specifically configures the account
to review follower requests. Furthermore, one
does not even have to follow a person to send
them a tweet. After a game, as long as an
individual knows the Twitter handle of the
athlete they want to contact, they can send a
tweet that the athlete will likely view. As noted
in the results, student-athletes are anxious to see
computer screen. Indeed, while many users list their real names, plenty hide
behind the security of anonymity when sending critical tweets.”).
41. Cindy Boren, Alabama-Auburn: Death Threats for Kicker After
Classic
Iron
Bowl,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
2,
2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/early-lead/wp/2013/12/02/alabamaauburn-death-threats-for-kicker-after-a-classic-iron-bowl-video/;
David
Jackson, Bush Sends Condolence Letter to Alabama Kicker, USA TODAY (Dec.
12, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2013/12/12/bush-alabamacade-foster-kicker-auburn/3995969/. Perhaps the most notorious episode
involved the Alabama place kicker, Cade Foster. In a difficult loss to Auburn
during the 2014 college football season, Foster missed three field goals of
varying lengths. Thereafter, in an attempt to win the game, a substitute
place kicker was sent in to try a last second field goal. Many remember the
epic touchdown run-back of Chris Davis, the Auburn player, when the
substitute kicker, Adam Griffith, missed a 57-yard field goal attempt.
Alabama lost the game and Foster immediately began receiving vulgar,
despicable tweets – including death threats.
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what people are saying about the game and
quickly look up their own messages but also
search their names on Twitter. Thus, even if
other Twitter users do not explicitly send an
athlete a message, if they simply use their name
in a tweet, the athlete can see it. Although some
participants attributed this behavior to
misguided fandom, the fact remains that
student-athletes are still 18–22 years old, and
the rate and content of critical tweets weighs
heavily on these young minds.42
Courts should evaluate a coach’s decision to limit their
student-athletes’ use of social media in the proper context –
where distractions and student welfare should dominate over
fans desired access to athletes. Coaches are hired to lead their
athletes to victory in a healthy, fair and competitive manner.
The question of student “rights” in the sports arena, including
the right to expression, is far more limited than it is, and
should be, in the classroom.
IV. The First Amendment, Like All Amendments, Is Neither
Literal Nor Absolute
The First Amendment reads in pertinent part, “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”43
If the First Amendment were literal, the question of
whether a coach – who is most assuredly not “Congress” – could
regulate their student-athlete’s speech would be easily
resolved. The plain language of the First Amendment speaks
only to Congress, not to coaches or other public school
employees.44 But, the First Amendment has been interpreted
far more broadly than its originally-penned eighteenth century
version.45 The First Amendment has been interpreted to apply
42.
43.
44.
45.
we may

Browning & Sanderson, supra note 10, at 517.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes
and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press — which are

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2

24

52

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1

to any governmental actor, federal or state, who imposes
regulations on an individual’s speech. Thus, through judicial
interpretation, the First Amendment has been found to apply
to public school teachers and other state employees seeking to
delimit a student’s speech.46
What is often lost in First Amendment discussion,
including when discussing social media usage, is the truism
that, “the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to
communicate one’s views at all times and places or in any
manner that may be desired.”47
Further, private regulation of speech does not implicate
the First Amendment. So, while the Athletic Department of
Notre Dame – a private, Catholic university – is not bound by
the First Amendment, Texas A&M University and other state
institutions are.48 This is a vital starting place for any First
Amendment discussion: no state actor, no First Amendment
problem.49
This article thus provides analysis for those state
universities and colleges that seek to regulate their athletes’
social media usage. When applying the First Amendment to
state actors, and state universities, it is imperative to

protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress — are
among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the
States.”). Gitlow, in 1925, marked the first time that the First Amendment
was deemed “incorporated” to apply equally to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
46. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
(giving First Amendment scrutiny to school officials’ decision to omit two
stories from a high school journalism paper); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (applying First Amendment protections to school employees
as state employees).
47. Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981).
48. Hudgens v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976)
(reminding, “[i]t is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional
guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by
government, federal or state.”).
49. Id. “[W]hile statutory or common law may in some situations extend
protection or provide redress against a private corporation or person who
seeks to abridge the free expression of others, no such protection or redress is
provided by the Constitution itself.” Id.
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appreciate the First Amendment is not absolute.50 Even if we
were to read the First Amendment as it is currently
interpreted to proclaim, “No state actor or employee, including
college coaches and athletic departments shall make a rule . . .
abridging the freedom of speech,” the Supreme Court’s current
jurisprudence indicates that speech may indeed, at times, be
abridged.51
In fact, while the Supreme Court has proclaimed that
students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the
schoolhouse gate,52 it is clear that students’ free speech rights
are not as robust as those of other adults.53 The Supreme
Court permitted the potential leaking of national secrets to be
printed in the Pentagon Papers case54 while simultaneously
prohibiting a student paper from printing stories about divorce
and teenage pregnancy.55 Politicians, or their surrogates, can
use untoward language as they seek election but a high school
student is prohibited from making a clever speech with sexual
innuendos.56 An adult can walk in to a courthouse wearing
50. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666. The Gitlow Court reminded,
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the
freedom of speech and of the press which is secured by the
Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speak or
publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose, or
an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity
for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom.
Id.
51. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007) (upholding a student’s
suspension for refusing to put down a banner reading “BONG Hits 4 JESUS”
after the student was instructed to do so by school officials).
52. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
53. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). See also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates:
What’s Left of Tinker, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000).
54. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
55. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(upholding school’s decision to censor stories on teen pregnancy and divorce
from school newspaper). The Supreme Court held “that educators do not
offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and
content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Id.
56. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682 (recognizing that the First Amendment
rights of public school students “are not automatically coextensive with the
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clothing that urges readers to “Fuck the Draft,”57 while a high
school student can be disciplined for wearing an American flag
on Cinco de Mayo.58 Religious activists can protest and hold
signs at a military veteran’s funeral that proclaim “God Hates
Fags” for the world to see,59 but a high school student can be
suspended for holding a sign that says “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”60
Students may not “shed their First Amendment rights at
the schoolhouse gate,” but they definitely do not have the same
level of First Amendment protections as their parents or other
adults. The Supreme Court has found that speech rights at
schools may be restricted based on the special learning-based
environment of a school.61 But, these cases, particularly the
seminal cases, focus on primary and secondary education not
colleges.62 Hence, the precedential value of these cases may be
somewhat diminished in the college setting.
Most commentators writing on the issue of college athletes’
social media usage rely on Tinker v. Des Moines to establish
that regulations can only be imposed on college students if
there is proof that a substantial, material disruption of the
classroom is implicated. This reliance is misplaced on two
levels.
First, Tinker is a high school case, not a college case. And,
I firmly believe that college students are qualitatively different,
for First Amendment purposes, from high school students.63
Protests are common on college campuses, ranging from sit-ins
rights of adults in other settings.”).
57. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
58. Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 745 F.3d 354 (9th Cir.
2014).
59. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213 (2011).
60. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
61. Hazelwood Sch Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1988).
62. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 393; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Bethel Sch.
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969).
63. See, e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667
(1973) (overturning, on First Amendment grounds, a journalism student’s
expulsion from the University for publishing a newspaper with a political
cartoon of a police officer raping the Statute of Liberty and Lady Justice and
for printing a story titled “Mother Fucker Acquitted” detailing the assault
trial of a New York Youth who was a member of the organization “Up Against
the Wall Mother Fucker.”).
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to rows and rows of crosses marking anti-abortion protests or
yellow ribbons to honor our military personnel or other political
demonstrations.
Our nation’s colleges represent the
quintessential marketplace of ideas.64 But, a college campus or
college classroom is not the same as a college arena or college
football field.
Second, while most other authors attempt to place the
social media usage regulations under the Tinker paradigm,
such paradigm focuses on academic issues, not athletic issues.
Tinker’s “material disruption” standard is ill-equipped to aid
courts in determining whether a particular form of speech or
expression might prove counterproductive to athletic
performance. Tinker focuses on the school’s academic setting,
not a campus’s athletic setting. Thus, I strongly believe that
any reliance on Tinker misses the key distinction between the
student-athlete as student and the student-athlete as athlete.
While Tinker might be applicable in the college setting, an
extension I am loath to embrace, Tinker nonetheless cannot
possibly apply to an athletic setting where the goal is
successful athletic performance not traditional academic
instruction.
A better analytical model comes either from cases
involving military personnel65 or the Supreme Court’s contentneutral time, place and manner line of cases.66 Under either
approach, the speech rights of athletes are more properly
cabined within the greater athletic framework emphasizing
team over individual. Because I have addressed, albeit it
briefly, application of the military personnel analogy in a
previous writing,67 I will focus solely on the time, place and
64. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-81 (1972) (noting at the
outset, “that state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from
the sweep of the First Amendment” and further confirming that “the college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the “‘marketplace of
ideas,’” and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this
Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.”).
65. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733 (1974).
66. See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
67. Mary Margaret Penrose, Free Speech Versus Free Education: First
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manner cases in this article.
Chief Justice Hughes first coined the phrase “time, place
and manner” in Cox v. New Hampshire in 1941.68 Since then,
numerous Supreme Court cases have held that content-neutral
speech regulations that primarily restrict the time, place and
manner of expression, not the expression itself, are
constitutional.
The First Amendment does not prohibit
limiting the location69 or volume70 of speech and expressive
activity.71 Instead, as noted in Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence:
Expression, whether oral or written or
symbolized by conduct is subject to reasonable
time, place, or manner restrictions. We have
often noted that restrictions of this kind are valid
provided they are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech, they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government interest, and that they leave open
ample alternative channels for communication of
the information.72
The key in all time, place and manner cases is the
requirement that the speech or expressive activity being
regulated be content-neutral,73 which ensures a regulation is
Amendment Considerations in Limiting Student Athlete’s Use of Social
Media, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 71 (2012).
68. Cox, 312 U.S. at 569.
69. Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding an ordinance
prohibiting picketing in front of specific residential properties); Clark, 468
U.S. at 288 (1984) (upholding a content-neutral regulation forbidding
individuals from sleeping in symbolic tents on the National Mall and at
Lafayette Park during a demonstration to generate attention for the plight of
the homeless); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
70. Ward, 491 U.S. at 781; Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
71. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding
both a 30 foot protest buffer zone and an excessive noise restriction).
72. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (citations omitted).
73. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc. For Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (1981). “A major criterion for a valid time, place, and manner restriction
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“not being applied because of disagreement with the message
presented.”74 Content-neutrality requires regulation that is
trans-substantive, or that applies to all speakers regardless of
the subject or message being conveyed.75 In Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley, the Supreme Court struck down an
ordinance prohibiting most picketing outside a school but
excepting peaceful picketing of a school involved in a labor
dispute because “[t]he. . .ordinance. . .describes permissible
picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful picketing on
the subject of a school’s labor-management dispute is
permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited.”76 As
Justice Marshall admonished, “. . .above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter
or its content.”77
When regulation targets particular
expression because of its message, content or subject matter,
the regulation is not content-neutral.78
Case law suggests the delineation of three requirements to
constitutionally satisfy the time, place and manner doctrine: (1)
content-neutral regulation; (2) that is narrowly tailored to
is that the restriction ‘may not be based upon either the content or subject
matter of speech.’” Id. at 648 (citation omitted).
74. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295.
75. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 93 (1972)
(striking down ordinance that prohibited all picketing within 150 feet of a
school when school is in session except “peaceful picketing of any school
involved in a labor dispute.”).
76. Id. at 95.
77. Id. (citations omitted).
78. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). The Court
reminds:
The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in
speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases
in particular, is whether the government has adopted a
regulation of speech because of disagreement with the
message it conveys. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
supra, at 295. The government's purpose is the controlling
consideration. A regulation that serves purposes unrelated
to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has
an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.
Id.
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serve a significant government interest; and, (3) leaves ample
channels of communication open to the speaker. The regulation
need not be the least restrictive possible, but merely must
satisfy the tripartite test announced in Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence.79 In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the
Supreme Court explained that time, place and manner
regulations are not analyzed to see if they provided the best fit,
constitutionally speaking, but are assessed only to ensure they
satisfy Clark and its progeny.80 Reviewing courts need not
evaluate time, place and manner regulations to ensure they are
the “least intrusive means of furthering [a] legitimate
governmental interest.”81 Rather, the question is simply
whether a particular regulation satisfies Clark’s three-part test
of content-neutrality, whether the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest and whether
it leaves alternative channels of communication open to the
speaker.82
One of the better case presentations analyzing Clark’s
three-part formula occurs in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.83
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, separates each of the
three elements for discussion into distinct sections.84 In doing
so, Justice Kennedy provides a clear roadmap for legislatures
and litigants alike to evaluate the constitutionality of speech
regulations.
This roadmap convinces this author that
reviewing courts will likely find coaches and athletic
departments’ regulation of their athletes’ social media accounts
constitutional.
A. Content Neutrality

79. Id. at 789-90 (reversing Second Circuit opinion because it
erroneously required “the city to prove that its regulation was the least
intrusive means of furthering its legitimate governmental interests. . . .”).
80. Id. at 791.
81. Id. at 789-90.
82. Id. at 791 (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288 (1984); Heffron v. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640
(1981)).
83. Id. at 791-803.
84. Id.
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Unlike many scholars in this area, this author believes
that the season-long wholesale ban is far more likely to satisfy
First Amendment scrutiny than those regulations that target
particular words, phrases or topics. The season-long bans,
those regulations requiring athletes to sign off of their Twitter
or Facebook accounts during their competitive season, are
content-neutral.
NO communications may be posted,
regardless of content. NO messages may be sent, regardless of
topic. A ban, while seemingly more oppressive than a simple
listing and policing of the prohibited “seven dirty words,”85
never considers the propriety or acceptability of the speech.86
All speech is equally prohibited regardless of whether it
involves self-promotion, sexually graphic materials, cursing,
injury updates, team strategies or devotions. A ban, by its very
nature, is content-neutral.87
In contrast, once the state begins choosing acceptable
verbiage or expression, reviewing courts will ordinarily review
such regulations under the highest, most arduous form of
constitutional review, strict scrutiny. As the Supreme Court
reminded in Cohen v. California:
[T]he

principle

[of

restricting

offensive

85. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (memorializing
comedian George Carlin’s monologue the seven words you could not say on
the airways: “shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker and tits”). Two
other authors participating in this Symposium have listed several words that
are prohibited by universities and colleges when their athletes participate in
social media dialogue. Ironically, once the state chooses a particular word,
i.e. “fuck,” or a particularly category, i.e. “curse words,” the state is engaging
in content-based prohibitions that receive the highest level and most
searching from of constitutional scrutiny from courts. These “seven dirty
words” prohibitions are far more likely to be found unconstitutional than an
outright ban moderated by time, place and manner regulations.
86. See, e.g., Jimmy Sanderson, To Tweet or Not to Tweet: Exploring
Division I Athletic Departments’ Social-Media Policies, 4 INT’L J. SPORTS
COMM. 492, 500-02 (2011).
87. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984) (“For there is not even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's
enactment or enforcement of this ordinance. There is no claim that the
ordinance was designed to suppress certain ideas that the City finds
distasteful or that it has been applied to appellees because of the views that
they express. The text of the ordinance is neutral — indeed it is silent —
concerning any speaker's point of view . . . .”).
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words] contended for by the State seems
inherently boundless. How is one to distinguish
[these words] from any other offensive word?
Surely the State has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically
palatable to the most squeamish among us. Yet
no readily ascertainable general principle exists
for stopping short of that result were we to affirm
the judgment below. For, while the particular
four-letter word being litigated here is perhaps
more distasteful than most others of its genre, it
is nevertheless true that one man’s vulgarity is
another’s lyric.88
Cohen required the state to provide a “compelling” reason
to prohibit an individual from wearing a jacket bearing the
phrase “Fuck the Draft.”89 Legislation need only satisfy a
“compelling” governmental interest when the Court invokes its
highest level of constitutional review, strict scrutiny. Strict
scrutiny generally results in a regulation being struck down
because unlike time, place and manner restrictions, strict
scrutiny requires proof that the regulation leaves no less
restrictive means available to accomplish the government
interest.90 As set forth above, the “no less restrictive means”
test does not apply in a time, place and manner evaluation.
Thus, while many scholars celebrate schools’ use of
prohibited words and call for educating student-athletes as to
“appropriate” behavior on social media, such content-based
approach strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.
Instead, using a time, place and manner analysis, the far more
likely constitutionally permissible approach is a contentneutral season long ban. No one is on social media during the
season . . . period.
88. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
89. Id. at 16, 26. “[A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason
for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single
four-letter expletive a criminal offense.” Id. at 26.
90. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90, 797-99 (1989).
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Using Justice Kennedy’s paradigm in Ward, a state
university’s main reason for imposing a season-long ban during
an athlete’s competitive season is to ensure that the athlete
remains focused on successful athletic performance.91 Much
like the volume and noise complaints at issue in Ward, “[t]his
justification for the guideline ‘ha[s] nothing to do with content,’
and it satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner
regulations be content-neutral.”92 State universities imposing
season-long bans do not delimit what words, what subjects, or
what topics are permissible. The universities, or their coaches
and athletic departments, are limiting wholesale distractions,
not just phrases or themes. Instead, in order to maintain the
team and athletes’ focus on the primary activity of athletic
competition, social media is proscribed during the competitive
season.

B. Narrowly Tailored to Serve a Significant Government
Interest
Once a regulation satisfies the content-neutral
requirement, there must be a demonstration of a narrow
tailoring (or fit) to serve a significant governmental interest.93
This really requires two assessments – the first being some
effort to properly tailor or shape the regulation so as to not
overly impact speech and, second, proof of a significant
governmental interest.
In the athletic context, as set forth above, the significant
government interest is to focus on the goal of athletics:
successful athletic performance. Universities field athletic
teams to promote competition and athletic success. Thus, it
appears that keeping 18- to 23-year-old student-athletes
focused on the task at hand, their athletic contests, would
91. Id. at 792.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 796.
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satisfy the significant governmental interest. This would be
particularly true for those student-athletes receiving athletic
scholarships. Those on athletic scholarships are literally being
given governmental resources (money) in exchange for focusing
at least part of their attention on contributing their time and
effort to successful athletic performance.
All student-athletes, however, are government supported
individuals, as even those not on athletic scholarship receive
the benefit of travel, tutors, enhanced training and medical
care, athletic instruction, clothing, equipment and other
athletic gear. The student-athlete, while not likely a state
employee, nonetheless is an individual representing the
university.94 And, these individuals are tasked with furthering
the state interest in fielding a successful athletic team on
behalf of the university. The university, accordingly, should be
permitted to justify their action based on the significant
government interest of encouraging successful athletic
performance.
The governmental interest upheld in Ward was protecting
citizens and visitors to Central Park from unwelcome noise.95
Here, the governmental interest is keeping athletes focused on
athletics, competition and performance. While this interest
may sound trite, states benefit from fielding successful athletic
teams.96 State universities with efficacious athletic programs
often see their national academic ranking heightened, their
applications increase, their admissions become more
competitive and their alumni support increased.97
More
94. Cf. Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731, 734-35 (10th Cir. 1981).
95. Ward, 491 U.S. at 796.
96. Michael L. Anderson, The Benefits of College Athletic Success: An
Application of the Propensity Score Design with Instrumental Variables 3
(Natl. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18196, 2012), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18196 (finding “robust evidence that football
success increases athletic donations, increases the number of applicants,
lowers a school’s acceptance rate, increases enrollment of in-state students,
increases the average SAT score of incoming classes, and enhances a school’s
academic reputation.”).
97. Id. at 24. These gains are not merely “reputational” but also directly
impact the university and its educational mission. Professor Anderson found:
For FBS schools, winning football games increases alumni
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attention from athletic prowess, both in the nature of academic
ranking and with alumni, tends to mean more community
support – be it financial or otherwise, localized or national.
More support lends itself to furthering the broader university
mission of educating the state’s citizenry. Thus, athletics,
ultimately further the state’s interest in education.
Once a significant government interest is demonstrated,
“the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as the
. . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’”98
State universities will be put to the test that without the
regulation, or season-long social media ban, keeping a team
focused on athletic performance is more difficult. This does not
require empirical evidence or identical treatment of every
program. It is not a “but-for” or “least restrictive means” test.99
Rather, courts tend to give deference to state actors to deal
with a problem (team and individual distractions) with
sufficient latitude to determine whether there is a need to act
and, if so, to assess those actions for reasonable fit, not
absolute precision.100
athletic donations, enhances a school’s academic reputation,
increases the number of applicants and in-state students,
reduces acceptance rates, and raises average incoming SAT
scores. The estimates imply that large increases in team
performance can have economically significant effects,
particularly in the area of athletic donations. Consider a
school that improves its season wins by 5 games (the
approximate difference between a 25th percentile season
and a 75th percentile season). Changes of this magnitude
occur approximately 8% of the time over a one-year period
and 13% of the time over a two-year period. This school may
expect alumni athletic donations to increase by $682,000
(28%), applications to increase by 677 (5%), the acceptance
rate to drop by 1.5 percentage points (2%), in-state
enrollment to increase by 76 students (3%), and incoming
25th percentile SAT scores to increase by 9 points (1%).
Id.
98. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
99. Id. at 798 (“Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm
today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must
be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral
interests but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means
of doing so.”).
100. Id. at 799-800.
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To be sure, this standard does not mean that a
time, place, or manner regulation may burden
substantially more speech than is necessary to
further the government’s legitimate interests.
Government may not regulate expression in such
a manner that a substantial portion of the
burden on speech does not serve to advance its
goals. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S., at 485
(“A complete ban can be narrowly tailored but
only if each activity within the proscription’s
scope is an appropriately targeted evil”). So long
as the means chosen are not substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the
government’s interest, however, the regulation
will not be invalid simply because a court
concludes that the government’s interest could be
adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative. “The validity of [time, place, or
manner] regulations does not turn on a judge’s
agreement with the responsible decision maker
concerning the most appropriate method for
promoting significant government interests” or
the degree to which those interests should be
promoted. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. at
689; see Community for Creative Non-Violence,
supra, at 299.101
Thus, a complete ban – particularly when that ban is
temporarily imposed to apply only during the competitive
season – should pass constitutional scrutiny. The reason that a
ban, as opposed to a more limited regulation targeting words or
actions, is necessary is two-fold: first, states may not pick and
choose proper discourse, words or conduct, without violating
the requirement of content-neutrality, and, second, only in
eradicating, entirely, the distractions posed by social media will
a team and its athletes be able to keep their focus on the court
101. Id.
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or the field. Social media presents a significant distraction
from successful athletic performance and a temporary ban
during the competitive season provides a constitutionally
effective way to curtail the distraction.
As the Supreme Court found in Frisby v. Schultz:
A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and
eliminates no more than the exact source of the
“evil” it seeks to remedy. City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789,
808-810, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2130-2132, 80 L.Ed.2d
772 (1984). A complete ban can be narrowly
tailored, but only if each activity within the
proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted
evil. For example, in Taxpayers for Vincent we
upheld an ordinance that banned all signs on
public property because the interest supporting
the regulation, an esthetic interest in avoiding
visual clutter and blight, rendered each sign an
evil. Complete prohibition was necessary because
“the substantive evil — visual blight — [was] not
merely a possible byproduct of the activity, but
[was] created by the medium of expression itself.”
Id., at 810, 104 S. Ct. at 2131.102
Imposing social media bans on student-athletes assures
that the athletes will not be improperly distracted, consumed
with virtual “socializing,” perpetually updating their status or
otherwise influenced in a manner that undermines team unity
and athletic performance.
The “evil” to be remedied is
distraction from “friends” and “followers” that undermine
teamwork and team performance. Social media usage presents
a broad and pervasive problem, much like visual clutter and
blight. Constitutionally, athletic departments are prohibited
from picking and choosing the messages or friends that an
athlete may communicate with but they are within their
constitutional power to delimit an athlete’s time spent on social
102. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1988).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2

38

66

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1

media just as they are permitted to control their athletes’
behavior through curfews and other team-imposed rules.
Nearly identical to the situation in City Council of Los Angeles
v. Taxpayers for Vincent, athletic departments are prohibited
from giving support to particular messages or viewpoints
without undermining the distraction posed by all social
media.103
Social media bans are analogous to the noise control issues
facing the Court in Ward. There, Justice Kennedy observed:
It is undeniable that the city’s substantial
interest in limiting sound volume is served in a
direct and effective way by the requirement that
the city’s sound technician control the mixing
board during performances. Absent this
requirement, the city’s interest would have been
served less well, as is evidenced by the
complaints about excessive volume generated by
respondent’s past concerts. The alternative
regulatory methods hypothesized by the Court of
Appeals
reflect
nothing
more
than
a
disagreement with the city over how much
control of volume is appropriate or how that level
of control is to be achieved. See Community for
Creative Non-Violence, supra, at 299. The Court
of Appeals erred in failing to defer to the city’s
reasonable determination that its interest in
controlling volume would be best served by
requiring bandshell performers to utilize the
city’s sound technician.104
To compare Ward to an athletic department’s regulation of
its student-athletes would read as follows: It is undeniable that
a university’s interest in keeping athletes focused on their
athletic contests is served in a direct and effective way by
banning their use of social media during the competitive
103. City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804
(1984).
104. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800.
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season. Absent this requirement, athletes are likely to be
distracted by continually focusing on social media, checking
and updating their profiles, communicating with fans and
critics alike, and dealing with criticism of their play that could
impact team chemistry or their own individual confidence and
performance. The alternative methods proffered by those
desiring greater access to, or perhaps for, student-athletes is
nothing but second guessing of a coach or athletic department’s
assessment of team chemistry and student welfare. Seasonlong bans generally last three to five months and ensure that a
student-athlete keeps their focus on why they are part of an
athletic team and department: to successfully represent the
institution in athletic contests.
C. Alternative Channels of Communication Remain Open
The final requirement under time, place and manner
analysis is that alternative channels of communication remain
open.105 The reported bans of social media have focused on
Twitter, Facebook and other social media outlets that
encourage virtual “friends” and “followers.” These virtual
worlds, a modern invention, help disseminate communications
– they are not communications in any intrinsic manner. Most
of the twentieth century witnessed interaction between
athletes and true friends and followers using email, cellphones,
text messaging and other traditional methods of
communication. Modern technology has perhaps curbed these
traditional forms of communication for our youth, but direct
communication is far from passé and provides protections that
virtual communications do not. Chief among the distinctions
between direct and virtual communications is that direct
communication requires a person to actually communicate
precisely – with a known number, address or person – versus
sending an indirect communication out to a virtual world
where the recipient may be known or unknown.
The critical feature of a season-long social media ban is
that these bans still permit “the more general dissemination of
105. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483.
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a message.”106 Student-athletes are not prohibited from
communicating with individuals – even fans – under the
current social media proscriptions. There are many, many
methods for these individuals to continue speaking and
expressing themselves in a myriad of ways outside social
media. Athletes may call individuals. They may appear at
press conferences to self-promote or further showcase their
talents. They may use email or text-messaging. Many benefit
from television exposure. They may even use placards or signs
or billboards. The current social media bans merely foreclose,
for a short period, one technique of communication but do not
preclude the dissemination of messages generally.
The advantage of direct communication or direct media
over social media is that individuals relying on direct media
can be more sure of who they are actually communicating with.
Further, direct communication makes if far more likely that a
student-athlete will limit their time and exposure with direct
media, eliminating a key component of the distractions coaches
seek to eliminate. Social media, as two professors note, is
empirically demonstrated to capture far more of an individual’s
time than telephone calls or other communication
techniques.107 If coaches must deal with athletes that are
reflexively, if not obsessively, checking their social media
status for updates via their cellphones throughout team
meetings, team meals, practices, team travel and even games,
there is a high likelihood for distraction coupled with a
lessened opportunity to develop proper team chemistry.
Direct communication requires focus and direction, i.e.
dialing a particular number, texting a particular person or
writing to a particular email address. For student-athletes, a
world without constant social media updates would require
talking to your teammates, focusing on school during study hall
and eliminating the divisive nature of competing for virtual
106. Id.
107. See Browning & Sanderson, supra note 10, at 509 (“Participants
reported checking Twitter frequently throughout the day, ranging from 20 to
hundreds of times each day.”). If students are obsessed with their social
media presence, chances are likely they are less “present” for other activities,
not the least of which includes all team and sport activities required from the
student athlete.
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“friends” and “followers.”
Unlike social media, to reach
hundreds or thousands of individuals at once, a person using
direct communication would have to make hundreds of phone
calls or send hundreds of emails. Direct communication, by its
very nature, limits the potential distraction and audience. But,
in no way does requiring direct communication eliminate, or
even lessen, the message.
In contrast, social media can be all-consuming and
distracting, opening individuals up to communications from
individuals posing as “friends” and “followers” whose main goal
– particularly with student-athletes – is to harass, harangue,
stalk or befriend individuals who they would otherwise never
have contact with. Social media allows an individual to send
something out into a virtual world that can literally reach
thousands of people simultaneously, with those people being
known or unknown, in fact potentially unknowable, by the
sender. Social media poses a much higher risk to studentwelfare based on the fact that student-athletes are highly
visible, highly impressionable and extremely vulnerable to fans
and critics’ postings. Finally, because students can become
obsessed with watching their social media profiles grow and
proliferate, social media is highly distracting, particularly for
the young athlete that seeks self-promotion and attention.
Provided athletic departments do not foreclose direct
communications, particularly those with known friends and
family members such as text messaging, cellphones, Facetime
and other forms of general communication, the season-long
bans proscribing Twitter and Facebook should satisfy the final
time, place and manner requirement.108 The risk posed by
social media is largely due to the unknown audience and
unknown “friends” and “followers” that begin to communicate
with the student-athlete.
These communications are
qualitatively distinct from direct communications with actual
friends and known acquaintances.
Coaches that impose season-long bans are not shutting
down an athlete’s ability to communicate with his or her larger

108. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483-84.
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audience.109 Instead, the coach is taking steps to ensure that
the student-athlete is protected from the mischiefs attendant to
social media, the harassment endured by many college athletes
on social media and the high level of distraction that these selffocused forms of communication entail. Coaches have valid
reasons for wanting to keep their athletes’ mind focused on the
court or field rather than the number of “friends” and
“followers” they have assembled. Coaches have similarly
appropriate reasons to keep their athletes focused on team
rather than individual.
Time, place and manner regulations merely require that
ample channels of communication remain open to the speaker.
Leaving ample channels open does not require identical
channels remain open.110 The key in time, place and manner,
is to ensure that a speaker can still spread his or her message –
not that the volume, impact or audience for the speaker remain
the same. For these reasons, season-long bans that permit
direct communications will likely pass constitutional muster.
V. Coaches Can Constitutionally Admonish Their Athletes,
“Shut It Off and Play”
Fans want unfettered access to their favorite players. I
understand this. I fully appreciate this. But, wanting to learn
what our favorite athletes are doing, thinking or having the
ability to send them notes of support or criticism is not
something that is constitutionally mandated. Rather, coaches
retain the right to regulate their athletes’ usage of social media
under proper content-neutral time, place and manner
restrictions. Prohibiting an athlete from using Facebook does
not preclude them from sending a text message to a friend or
relative or a known fan. Proscribing an athlete from utilizing
Twitter during the season, pre-season or any time before or
after competition does not exclude them from calling
individuals to discuss their performance or lament a tough loss.
In each instance where social media usage has been foreclosed,
109. Id.
110. Id.
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other options for communication – often options that require
some familiarity with the individual – remain available to the
athlete. What these policies tend to limit are simply the
communications that get sent everywhere, to everyone that
remain forever available on the internet to haunt a player and
his or her university and athletic department. Rather than
exist in a virtual world where someone may never meet their
“friends” and “followers,” coaches retain the power to limit
their players’ interactions to known individuals. Players live in
a world that is hypersensitive and hypercritical to the athlete’s
every move and coaches retain the power to limit those
interactions. The First Amendment poses no impediment.
The coach’s non-speech reasoning for such regulations is
simple: successful athletic performance. The goal of athletics is
to win. Coaches owe their players and the colleges for which
they coach the duty to field the most competitive team they can
ethically and athletically field. If a coach were to regulate
speech and advise a player to “shut it off”, that might be a
speech-based regulation. But, even in those instances where it
appears the coach is striving to limit the information their
athletes post or tweet, the reality is that the coach is seeking to
minimize distractions to athletic performance, not regulate the
content of their athletes’ speech. It is not that coaches want
their athletes not to talk. Rather, the truth remains that
coaches want, actually need, their athletes to focus – focus on
team, focus on performance and focus on winning.
Supreme Court precedent permits reasonable time, place
and manner regulations provided those regulations are
content-neutral (here, the regulations are generally complete
bans from certain, but not all, social media formats), not
intended to curtail speech or expression (here, the goal is on
improving athletic performance) and retain other comparative
avenues for speech or expression (here, cell phones, email and
other social media with known users). The current regulations
imposed by some Division I coaches appear to be
constitutionally acceptable. These regulations aid coaches in
protecting their athletes from outside distractions and
unknown detractors whose communications can impact athletic
performance and outcome.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/2
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But, good law does not always make good policy. The fact
that coaches, athletic departments and colleges may legally be
entitled to regulate their student athletes’ social media usage
does not automatically suggest they should. We live in a
decidedly modern world where 24/7 news and entertainment
access shapes our cultural experience. This author believes
that each coach, each athletic program has the legal authority
to choose for itself and its athletes the best course regarding
social media. What may be good for Texas A&M may not work
as well at Kansas. And, under existing First Amendment
precedent it appears that the best course is to be charted
individually by each school.
Social media regulations
absolutely implicate the First Amendment.
But, as
demonstrated above, implicating the First Amendment is not
the same as violating the First Amendment. Despite fans’
desire to have unfettered access to their favorite college
athletes via social media, such access is not constitutionally
mandated.
Successful athletic performance, not social
interaction with “friends” and “followers,” is the goal of
athletics. My belief, my hope, is that the courts will both
recognize and support this goal in line with past precedent.
The First Amendment literally permits coaches to instruct
their athletes to “shut it off and play.” Whether they choose to
do so is an entirely different matter that, like so many other
choices, is best decided between coach and player.111

111. A great example of how the issue of banning or permitting Twitter
remains a policy decision is the decision by Coach Chris Peterson, the new
University of Washington head football coach, to allow his football players at
UW to use social media despite having been one of the first college coaches to
ban social media while at Boise State. Taylor Soper, New UW Football Coach
Lifts
Twitter
Ban
for
Players,
GEEKWIRE (Apr. 19, 2014),
http://www.geekwire.com/2014/chris-petersen-huskies-social-media/.
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